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IN RE REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE
FROM THE FEDERA TIVE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL:
A BLOW TO INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL
ASSISTANCE
Evidence gathering for criminal investigations and litigation within the
United States necessarily implicates constitutional principles.' The difficul-
ties inhering in this process are compounded when the evidence is not found
within the United States, but is located within another sovereign nation.2 In
this latter situation, prosecutors must consider not only United States consti-
tutional principles, but also issues of jurisdiction,3 international law,4 and
1. See U.S. CONsT. amends. IV, V & VI.
2. See III (a) UNITED STATES ATToRNEYS' MANUAL § 9-13.510 (1988) [hereinafter
MANUAL] ("Most problems associated with international evidence gathering revolve around
the concept of sovereignty" and the idea that every nation must respect and abide by the laws
of the sovereign or state in which the evidence is located). Sovereignty is defined, in part, as
"the international independence of a state, combined with the right and power of regulating its
internal affairs without foreign dictation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1396 (6th ed. 1990).
All nations jealously guard sovereignty. See Joseph F. Weis, Jr., The Federal Rules and The
Hague Conventions: Concerns of Conformity and Comity, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 903, 903 (1989)
(recognizing the concept of territorial sovereignty as "a very real concern posing substantial
problems in transnational litigation"); Michael Goldsmith & Vicki Rinne, Civil RICO, Foreign
Defendants, and "ET", 73 MINN. L. REV. 1023, 1029 n.28 (1989) (depicting "extraterritorial
actions as 'intrusions into another's domestic affairs and as a challenge going to the heart of
[the] notion of sovereignty'" (quoting Alan Gottlieb, Extraterritoriality: A Canadian Perspec-
tive, 5 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 449, 452 (1983))). Violation of a nation's sovereignty will
frequently generate diplomatic protests, denial of access to the requested evidence, and in some
extreme cases, will result in an arrest warrant being issued and subsequent incarceration of the
agent or attorney who violates the law. MANUAL, supra, § 9-13.510. Prosecutors can avoid
such consequences, and at the same time obtain the necessary assistance, by invoking the aid of
the sovereign when seeking evidentiary assistance. Id.
3. See In re Sealed Case, 832 F.2d 1268, 1272-73 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (requiring a court to
establish personal jurisdiction over the person who has control over the documents requested
or the individual whose testimony is requested when the evidence is not handed over
voluntarily).
4. See MANUAL, supra note 2, § 9-13.522-523. Treaties, conventions, and executive
agreements are the principal sources of applicable international law. Id.
Currently, the United States has bilateral mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs) in force
with Anguilla, the Bahamas, Belgium, the British Virgin Islands, Canada, the Cayman Islands,
Italy, Mexico, Monserrat, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Turkey, and Turks and Caicos. See
Agreement Extending Application of the Treaty Concerning the Cayman Islands Relating to
Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters to Montserrat, Apr. 26, 1991, U.S.-U.K., Hein's
No. KAV 2880; Agreement Extending Application of the Treaty Concerning the Cayman Is-
lands Relating to Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters to Anguilla, the British Virgin
Islands and Turks and Caicos Islands, Nov. 9, 1990, U.S.-U.K., Hein's No. KAV 2762; Treaty
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most importantly, the laws of the foreign country in which the evidence is
located.5 Nations generally employ three methods when seeking interna-
tional legal assistance:6 informal requests,7 subpoenas,' and formal re-
quests.9 This Note examines one type of formal request, letters rogatory.
with Belgium on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Jan. 28, 1988, U.S.-Belg., S.
TREATY Doc. No. 16, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); Mutual Legal Assistance Cooperation
Treaty with Mexico, Dec. 9, 1987, U.S.-Mex., S. TREATY Doc. No. 13, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1988); Treaty with the Bahamas on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, June 12 and Aug.
18, 1987, U.S.-Bah., S. TREATY Doc. No. 17, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); Treaty with
Canada on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Mar. 18, 1985, U.S.-Can., S.
TREATY Doc. No. 14, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); Treaty with the United Kingdom Con-
cerning the Cayman Islands Relating to Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, July 3,
1986, U.S.-U.K., S. TREATY Doc. No. 8, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); Treaty with the Italian
Republic on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Nov. 9, 1982, U.S.-Italy, S. TREATY
Doc. No. 25, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
5. See supra note 2. See also United States v. Salim, 855 F.2d 944, 949 (2d Cir. 1988)
(permitting the admission of testimony in a United States criminal proceeding taken according
to the procedural rules of a foreign country which are inconsistent with those of the United
States); Michael J. Burke, Note, United States v. Salinfv A Harbinger For Federal Prosecutions
Using Depositions Taken Abroad, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 895, 942 (1990) (concluding that the
Second Circuit's approach in Salim will allow United States prosecutors to obtain evidence
abroad for use in a domestic proceeding even though the foreign procedural rules are incom-
patible with federal procedural requirements).
6. See MANUAL, supra note 2, § 9-13.520. See also id. § 9-13.500 ("International legal
assistance is the process of obtaining aid from abroad in connection with United States investi-
gations and prosecutions, or from the United States in connection with foreign investigations
and prosecutions.").
7. See id. § 9-13.520 ("Informal requests use ad hoc methods to secure assistance, often
more quickly and flexibly than by formal means .... ). This can be accomplished if the
evidence is voluntarily produced by the individual or entity controlling it, whether the individ-
ual or entity is a police organization, government agency, corporation, or private citizen. See
supra note 2. Depending on how important the evidence sought is to the successful outcome of
the proceedings in the United States, it may be advantageous for a prosecutor to employ a
formal method to ensure, to the extent possible, that evidence is obtained legally and will be
admissible in a United States court. Cf Salim, 855 F.2d at 944 (acknowledging the impor-
tance of obtaining evidence abroad in a manner acceptable to federal courts). Moreover, cru-
cial evidence obtained in an unacceptable manner may not be admissible and could result in
dismissal of the case. Id.; see also MANUAL, supra note 2, § 9-13.520.
8. See MANUAL, supra note 2, § 9-13.520. Evidence can be obtained unilaterally without
the aid of a foreign nation through the use of a subpoena ordering production of documents or
testimony. Id. § 9-13.525. Courts will generally issue a subpoena only if there is personal
jurisdiction over the individual or entity in control of the evidence sought. See LETTERS
ROGATORY 50, 60 (Bernard A. Grossman ed., 1956) (remarks of Samuel M. Fink) (suggesting
that issuing a subpoena compelling the production of evidence without the ability to penalize
those who fail to comply with it would be "an empty gesture").
9. See MANUAL, supra note 2, § 9-13.520. Formal requests for judicial assistance in-
clude treaty requests, requests under executive agreement, and letters rogatory. Id. If an
MLAT exists, the requesting party can obtain the evidence so long as it comports with applica-
ble treaty requirements. See id. § 9-13.522. Compliance with a request made pursuant to such
an agreement is mandatory since treaties have the force and effect of law under the Constitu-
tion. See U.S. CONST. art. IV. Executive agreements, on the other hand, apply to specific
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A letters rogatory is a formal request issued by "a judge in... [one coun-
try] to the judiciary of a foreign country requesting the performance of an
act which, if done without the sanction of the foreign court, would constitute
a violation of that country's sovereignty.' 0 The contents of a letters roga-
tory vary depending on the country from which assistance is requested."
The request typically includes background information regarding "who is
investigating whom and for what charge,"' 2 the assistance requested, the
facts of the case, the text of the applicable statutes,'3 and a promise of reci-
procity by the requesting court.'4 The foreign judicial authority making the
request generally signs the documents constituting the letters rogatory.I5
The foreign government then authenticates the documents through either an
apostille or a chain certificate of authentication,' 6 and subsequently forwards
the documents through diplomatic channels to the court in the jurisdiction
where the evidence is located.' 7 Statutes in the jurisdiction executing the
investigations. MANUAL, supra note 2, § 9-3.523. These agreements are temporary by nature
and may be replaced at some point in time by MLATs. Id. In the absence of either an MLAT
or executive agreement, assistance can be requested through use of a letters rogatory. See id.
§ 9-13.520-521.
10. Id. § 9-13.521. See also LETTERS ROGATORY, supra note 8, at 9, 10 (remarks of Lu-
cien R. LeLievre) (defining letters rogatory as "formal communications from a court of one
country to a court of another country requesting the latter to direct the taking of testimony of
a witness within its jurisdiction for the use of the court making the request"); Harry L. Jones,
International Judicial Assistance: Procedural Chaos and a Program for Reform, 62 YALE L.J.
515, 519 (1953) (defining letters rogatory as a "request by a domestic court to a foreign court
to take evidence from a certain witness"). For a description of other types of formal requests,
see supra note 9. In the absence of a treaty or executive agreement, "[l]etters rogatory are an
important device by which governments and their officials may enlist the assistance of foreign
courts in requiring the production of evidence." In re Request for Int'l Judicial Assistance
(Letter Rogatory) for the Federative Rep. of Braz., 936 F.2d 702, 704 (2d Cir. 1991) [hereinaf-
ter Brazil 111].
11. MANUAL, supra note 2, § 9-13.521.
12. Id.
13. Id. The applicable statutes include those that are alleged to have been violated, the
penalties for violation of the statutes, and the statute of limitations for the alleged offenses. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See id. An apostille is a less time-consuming form of authentication which may be
used if the requesting country is a member of the Hague Convention. Id. The latter method is
a more cumbersome process involving authentication by the foreign judiciary making the re-
quest, the embassy of the foreign country, and the United States Department of State. Id.
17. See LErrERs ROGATORY, supra note 8, at 50, 61 (remarks of Samuel M. Fink). In
the absence of established procedures under a treaty or some other governing agreement, let-
ters rogatory generally are not forwarded directly to the foreign court. Id. The proper chan-
nels vary depending on the countries involved. See Jones, supra note 10, at 529. Requests
coming into the United States regarding criminal cases are usually forwarded to the Depart-
ment of State under cover of a diplomatic note. See MANUAL, supra note 2, § 9-13.521. The
request is then forwarded to the Office of International Affairs, Criminal Division in the
United States Department of Justice, where it is reviewed to ensure that it meets procedural
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request govern the execution of letters rogatory. 18 In the absence of any
treaty obligation, the execution of letters rogatory is a matter of comity. I9
Therefore, the receiving court will have substantial discretion in deciding
whether to execute the request.20
Before 1948, the United States showed little concern for the problems as-
sociated with foreign evidence gathering. 2 1 However, in the past few de-
cades, disputes involving international elements have become increasingly
common, 22 creating a need for more efficient and effective methods of ob-
and substantive standards of United States law. See id. § 9-13.540. If the request is deficient,
it is returned to the foreign country making the request. See In re Request for Int'l Judicial
Assistance (Letter Rogatory) from the Federative Rep. of Braz., 687 F. Supp. 880, 882
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) [hereinafter Brazil ]] (noting that the original letters rogatory was returned to
Brazilian authorities for revisions). If the request complies with federal law, it is forwarded to
the United States Attorney's Office in the jurisdiction in which the evidence is located for
execution. See MANUAL, supra note 2, § 9-13.540. Ultimately, the district court in that juris-
diction has discretion to determine whether the letters rogatory is sufficient under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1782. MICHAEL ABBELL & BRUNO A. RISTAU, 3 INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE
§ 12-3-3(1) (1990).
18. LErrERS ROGATORY, supra note 8, at 61-62 (remarks of Samuel M. Fink) (explaining
that procuring evidence pursuant to a letters rogatory is completely controlled by the proce-
dural methods of the "foreign tribunal which is requested to assist in the administration of
justice").
19. See Harry L. Jones, Letters Rogatory in Federal Practice, in LETrERS ROGATORY,
supra note 8, at 73 (pointing out that United States federal courts regard execution of letters
rogatory, not subject to treaty or executive agreement, as nothing more than a "matter of
comity"); P.F. Sutherland, The Use of the Letter of Request (or Letters Rogatory) For the Pur-
pose of Obtaining Evidence For Proceedings in England and Abroad, 31 INT'L COMP. L. Q. 784,
785 (Oct. 1982) (stating that "[c]ompliance with a letter of request received from a foreign
requesting court has generally been considered a matter of courtesy" in the absence of a treaty
or agreement stating otherwise). The principle of "comity" generally refers to the deference
and mutual respect that a sovereign nation will give to the laws and judicial decisions of other
sovereign nations pertaining to matters in their own respective territories. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 267 (6th ed. 1990) (defining comity).
20. See Philip W. Amram, Public Law No. 88-619 of October 3, 1964 - New Develop-
ments in International Judicial Assistance in the United States of America, 32 J. BAR ASS'N
D.C. 24, 30-31 (1965) (explaining that while § 1782 authorizes judicial assistance where com-
pulsion of the witness is necessary, the ultimate execution of the request is entirely within the
discretion of the court).
21. Jones, supra note 10, at 556-59 (describing isolationist policies of the United States
from 1854 until after World War II).
22. Hans Smit, International Litigation Under the United States Code, 65 COLUM. L.
REV. 1015, 1015 n.1 (1965) (documenting "the vast growth of international commerce" from
1950 to the present).
The growth of economic interdependence between nations which has occurred dur-
ing the last four decades, the increasing internationalization of the world's capital
markets, the extraordinary advances in communications and information sharing
technology, and the increased ease with which travel between distant places can be
made with minimum loss of time and maximum convenience have all served to en-
hance the opportunities for the international criminal ....
[Vol. 41:545
Request For Judicial Assistance
taining assistance.2 3 Therefore, in 1948, Congress amended an antiquated
and restrictive statute enacted in 1863, which permitted courts to provide
judicial assistance to foreign courts, but only in very limited circum-
stances.2 4 Congress further amended the statute in 1949 by broadening the
1948 language and increasing the power of United States district courts to
execute requests for assistance. 25  The current version of the statute
("§ 1782"), enacted by Congress in 1964, enables foreign entities to gather
evidence more effectively in the United States.2 6 Section 1782 authorizes
[t]he district court... in which a person resides or is found ... [to]
order him to give his testimony ... or to produce a document...
for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal. The
order may be made pursuant to a letter[s] rogatory issued, or re-
quest made, by a foreign or international tribunal or upon the ap-
plication of any interested person .... 2
Following the 1964 amendments, American courts for the most part have
responded favorably to foreign requests for judicial assistance,28 and have
executed most requests without conflict.2 9 In the past few years, however,
litigation surrounding § 1782 has increased and courts are divided over the
standard to apply in analyzing letters rogatory requests. The litigation often
deals with requests for evidence when no formal criminal charges are pend-
ing in the foreign country and evidence is needed to determine whether
charges should be brought.3 In those cases, courts must resolve two issues
Robert G. Clark, International Cooperation in the Investigation and Prosecution of Economic
Crimes, 26 RESOURCE MATERIAL SER. 52 (Dec. 1984) (emphasis added). Cf Weis, supra note
2, at 903 (attributing the increase in private international litigation to the "rapid growth of
worldwide trade after World War II").
23. H.R. REP. No. 1052, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1963) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT]; S.
REP. No. 1580, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1964) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT], reprinted in
1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782, 3783 (attributing the growth of international litigation with the in-
crease in international trade, which in turn created a need for improved procedures in the
United States to facilitate assistance).
24. Pub. L. No. 773, 62 Stat. 949 (1948). See infra notes 58, 65-67 and accompanying
text.
25. Pub. L. No. 73, 63 Stat. 103 (1949). See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
26. Pub. L. No. 88-619, § 9(a), 78 Stat. 997 (1964) (codified at 28 U.S.C § 1782).
27. 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1988).
28. Clark, supra note 22, at 54-55 ("United States courts have almost uniformly honored
letters rogatory requests when they have been found to have been made by properly consti-
tuted tribunals within the meaning of the statute ....").
29. Id. at 55. Generally, United States courts have recognized Congress' intent that re-
quests for judicial assistance be executed "unless specific reasons exist to deny a request." Id.
30. This Note is limited to a discussion of requests in criminal matters. However, there
exists a significant number of cases dealing with requests in civil cases. See generally ABBELL
& RISTAU, supra note 17 (describing similarities and differences of procedures applicable in
both civil and criminal letters rogatory).
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before granting requests for judicial assistance. First, the court must deter-
mine the nature of the proceeding and whether it falls within the definition
of § 1782."' Second, in the absence of a pending proceeding, the court must
determine the likelihood of formal proceedings taking place in the future.
32
Regarding these two issues, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit takes the most rigid approach of all the circuits."a In In re
Request for International Judicial Assistance (Letter Rogatory) for the Feder-
ative Republic of Brazil (Brazil j11),34 the Second Circuit adopted a standard
requiring proceedings to be "imminent," or "very likely to occur within a
brief interval from the request," before a district court can execute a letters
rogatory request.35 This standard virtually nullifies the ability of district
courts to render assistance in the absence of a pending criminal proceeding.
Brazil III arose out of the criminal prosecution of a former senior vice-
president of Morgan Guaranty Trust Company ("Morgan"), Antonio
Gebauer.36 Gebauer embezzled more than $4 million from bank accounts
which six Panamanian corporations held at Morgan on behalf of four Brazil-
ian citizens. Gebauer's criminal prosecution alerted Brazilian officials to the
31. See Brazil III, 936 F.2d 702, 705 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Fonseca v. Blumenthal, 620
F.2d 322, 324 (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (refusing to grant assistance to the Superintendent of
the Exchange Control of Colombia for failing to meet the impartiality test), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 882 (1984); In re Letters of Request to Examine Witnesses From the Court of Queen's
Bench for Man., Can., 488 F.2d 511, 512 (9th Cir. 1973) [hereinafter Manitoba I1] (refusing to
grant judicial assistance in response to a letters rogatory request when the requesting party's
sole purpose is to conduct an investigation unrelated to a judicial or quasi-judicial matter); In
re Letters Rogatory Issued by the Director of Inspection of the Gov't of India, 385 F.2d 1017,
1021-22 (2d Cir. 1967) [hereinafter India] (denying assistance to an Indian income tax official
because he failed to qualify as a "tribunal" under the statute). But see In re Letter of Request
From the Crown Prosecution Serv. of the U.K., 870 F.2d 686, 689-91 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (grant-
ing assistance where request is made by an "interested person"); In re Letter Rogatory from
the Tokyo District, Tokyo, Japan, 539 F.2d 1216, 1219 (9th Cir. 1976) [hereinafter Tokyo]
(executing a letters rogatory request from the Tokyo District Court because its investigation
was related to a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding); In re Letter Rogatory from the Public
Prosecutor's Court at the Regional Court of Hamburg, F.R.G., No. M-19-88, 1988 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14088, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 1988) (holding that a prosecutor is an "interested
person" authorized to request assistance under § 1782).
32. See Brazil III, 936 F.2d at 706 (requiring the proceedings to be "imminent," i.e. very
likely to occur within a short period of time); Crown Prosecution, 870 F.2d at 687 (requiring
proceedings to be within "reasonable contemplation"); In re Request for Assistance From the
Ministry of Legal Affairs of Trin. & Tobago, 848 F.2d 1151, 1156 (1 1th Cir. 1988) [hereinafter
Trinidad & Tobago] (confining assistance to those requests where the proceeding is "very likely
to occur"), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1005 (1989).
33. See supra note 32. The Supreme Court has yet to address these issues.
34. 936 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1991).
35. Id. at 703.
36. Id.
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considerable amount of money in these accounts. 7 The officials subse-
quently began an investigation to determine whether the four individuals
had violated Brazilian tax and currency control laws through capital flight.3"
At the behest of Brazilian investigators, Brazilian Judge Anna Maria Pi-
mentel issued a letters rogatory request for the production of various ac-
count documents held at Morgan.39 The United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York issued an order to execute the request. 40
The court subsequently issued a subpoena duces tecum ordering the produc-
tion of the requested testimony and documents from Morgan.41 The Pana-
manian corporations filed a motion to quash the subpoena.42 The district
court, after reviewing information on the legal system of Brazil 43 and a dec-
laration by Judge Pimentel, made two rulings. First, the court found that
there were no adjudicative judicial proceedings currently pending in Bra-
37. Id. There was more than U.S. $6 million combined in the accounts maintained for
four Brazilian citizens. Brazil I, 687 F. Supp. 880, 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
38. Brazil III, 936 F.2d at 703. While there is no universal definition for "capital flight,"
see Barnaby J. Feder, Capital Flight Adds to Burden of Debtor Nations, N.Y. TIMES, June 9,
1986, at D4, the term is generally thought to refer to "outflows [of capital] caused by a resi-
dent's fear that his domestic assets will soon suffer big capital losses, perhaps through hyperin-
flation, exchange-rate depreciation, taxation or expropriation." Anything to Declare, Seijor?,
THE ECONOMIST (U.K. ed.), Oct. 3, 1987, at 86.
39. Brazil III, 936 F.2d at 703. The letters rogatory stated that there was a police investi-
gation underway to determine whether the Brazilian citizens who maintained accounts at Mor-
gan had violated Brazilian tax and currency control laws. Brazil I, 687 F. Supp. at 882. The
following is an excerpt from the official translated request:
HONORABLE ANNA MARIA PIMENTEL, Judge of the 5th Division makes it
known that in this Court and Secretariat proceedings of the Police Investigation no.
148-PCD/86 are under way, commenced in view of the request contained in the
Office of the Attorney General . . . aiming at assessing and determining possible
offenses of tax evasion related to an alleged defalcation on bank accounts maintained
by Brazilian citizens with the MORGAN GUARANTEE [sic] TRUST COMPANY
OF NEW YORK aggregating to about US $6,000,000.00 ....
Id. (brackets in original).
40. Brazil I, 687 F. Supp. at 882.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 883. The Panamanian corporations argued that the requested evidence was not
sought "for use in a judicial proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal" as required by
§ 1782. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1782).
43. In re Request for Int'l Judicial Assistance (Letter Rogatory) for the Federative Rep.
of Braz., 700 F. Supp. 723, 725 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) [hereinafter Brazil Il], rev'd, 936 F.2d 702 (2d
Cir. 1991). The district court found that the procedure followed in the Brazilian criminal
system is divided into pre-accusatory and post-accusatory stages. Id. According to Brazilian
legal experts, " 'adjudicative judicial criminal proceedings begin in Brazil only after the de-
fendant is made party to the action and both sides to the controversy are before the courts.'"
Id. (quoting Petitioner's Supplemental Reply Memorandum at 7).
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zil." Second, the court found that even though no proceedings were pres-
ently pending, such proceedings were "probable."45 Therefore, the court
denied the motion to quash.46 The Panamanian corporations appealed to
the Second Circuit.
The Second Circuit rejected the district court's interpretation of the stat-
ute.47 The panel interpreted the "probable" standard enunciated by the dis-
trict court as "too lenient" in light of the lack of legislative history
surrounding the 1964 amendments to § 1782.48 Therefore, the Second Cir-
cuit implemented a new "imminence" standard, requiring a proceeding to be
"very likely to occur" within a brief period of time.49
This Note analyzes the purpose behind 28 U.S.C. § 1782, and the effec-
tiveness of its current application regarding the execution of foreign requests
for judicial assistance. First, this Note describes the evolution and develop-
ment of § 1782 from its initial enactment in 1855 through the 1964 amend-
ments. This Note then discusses the increasingly restrictive judicial
interpretations of § 1782 since the enactment of the 1964 amendments,
which have effectively limited the ability of United States district courts to
render judicial assistance. Next, this Note analyzes the Brazil III decision
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which repre-
sents the latest and most restrictive application of § 1782. Finally, this Note
concludes that the interpretation of § 1782 by the Second Circuit in Brazil
III is erroneous and will have devastating repercussions on international ju-
dicial assistance in criminal cases.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF 28 U.S.C. § 1782
A. Execution of Letters Rogatory Before 1948
On February 2, 1854, the French Government forwarded a letters roga-
tory to the Department of State from a French court requesting witness tes-
timony in connection with a preliminary criminal proceeding in France. °
44. Id. There were no charges pending in Brazil. Id. In addition, the Brazilian citizens
were not parties to any action. Id. Therefore, there were no adjudicatory judicial criminal
proceedings pending in Brazil. Id.
45. Id. This finding was based on a letter submitted to the court by Judge Pimentel stat-
ing that the evidence sought" 'is to be used exclusively as evidence in a judicial proceeding...
[and] will not be used for any other purpose.' " Id. (quoting Judge Pimentel's declaration to
the court).
46. Id.
47. Brazil III, 936 F.2d 702, 706 (2d Cir. 1991).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 703, 706.
50. Jones, supra note 10, at 540. The request was issued by a Frenchjuge d'instruction, "a
magistrate sitting in a preliminary criminal proceeding." Id. at 541.
[Vol. 41:545
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The United States Government, however, lacked statutory authority to exe-
cute the request.5' One year later, in response to this embarrassing debacle,
Congress passed the first statute authorizing federal courts to assist foreign
courts in gathering evidence located within the United States.
52
The Act of March 2, 1855 granted broad powers to United States circuit
courts to respond to letters rogatory.5 ' Specifically, the 1855 Act authorized
the examination of witnesses in response to letters rogatory issued from any
court of a foreign country.5 4 Therefore, provided the request was issued by a
foreign court, witness testimony was virtually assured. The impact of this
statute, however, was minimal and short-lived. The 1855 Act was mis-
indexed in the United States Code and, consequently, knowledge of its exist-
ence was limited. 55 Moreover, the enactment of subsequent letters rogatory
legislation eight years later5 6 rendered the 1855 Act obsolete.
The subsequent statute governing the execution of foreign requests for ju-
dicial assistance was enacted on March 3, 1863.58 The 1863 Act substan-
tially curtailed the ability of American courts to provide assistance of any
kind to a foreign court requesting it. 9 Assistance was limited to civil pro-
ceedings pending in a foreign court in which the foreign government had an
51. Id. at 540. At the time of the request, Attorney General Cushing informed Secretary
of State Marcy that there was no statute authorizing United States courts to compel witness
testimony pursuant to a letters rogatory request. Id. Secretary of State Marcy later communi-
cated this to the French Ambassador and refused the request. Id.
52. Act of Mar. 2, 1855, ch. 140, § 2, 10 Stat. 630 (authorizing the execution of letters
rogatory "from any court of a foreign country to any circuit court of the United States... to
make the examination of witnesses [located within the United States]"). In a letter to French
Ambassador Sartiges, Secretary of State Marcy advised that the enactment of the 1855 Act
would allow the United States government to execute the French request made in the preced-
ing year. Jones, supra note 10, at 541 n.79.
53. In re Letter Rogatory From the Justice Court, Dist. of Montreal, Can., 523 F.2d 562,
564 (6th Cir. 1975) [hereinafter Montreal] (acknowledging the broad grant of powers pursuant
to the 1855 Act).
54. Act of March 2, 1855, ch. 140 § 2, 10 Stat. 630. See supra note 52 for the text of the
statute in pertinent part.
55. Jones, supra note 10, at 540. The 1855 Act was indexed under the heading of "Mis-
trials" in the Statutes at Large. Id. at 540 n.77.
56. The Treasury Department, which proposed the Act of March 3, 1863, was apparently
unaware of the earlier statute. Id.
57. Compare Act of March 2, 1855, ch. 140, § 2, 10 Stat. 630 with Act of March 3, 1863,
ch. 95, § 4, 12 Stat. 769-70. See supra note 52 and infra note 58 for applicable text.
58. Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 95, §§ 1-4, 12 Stat. 769 (limiting the ability of United States
courts to execute requests for "the testimony of any witness residing within the United States,
to be used in any suit for the recovery of money or property depending in any court in any
foreign country with which the United States are at peace, and in which the government of
such foreign country shall be a party or shall have an interest .... [i]f a... letters rogatory to
take such testimony shall have been issued from the court in which said suit is pending").
59. Jones, supra note 10, at 540.
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interest.' Furthermore, the foreign government had to be at peace with the
United States.6 ' As a result, American courts were forced to deny assistance
in many cases simply because they lacked the requisite power to compel
witness testimony pursuant to a letters rogatory request.62
The tremendous growth of international commerce, coupled with the
increase in "international" litigation after World War HI,63 brought to the
forefront the critical deficiencies preventing countries from obtaining inter-
national judicial assistance from the United States." Congress responded by
enacting 28 U.S.C. § 1782 in 1948.65
B. The Development and Expansion of§ 1782
The enactment of § 1782 in 1948 was the first of a series of amendments
broadening the scope of the statute governing the execution of foreign re-
quests for judicial assistance. The 1948 amendments made two important
changes to the then-existing law. First, Congress expanded the statute to
60. The statute specifically requires that the suit be for "the recovery of money or prop-
erty." See supra note 58. Other than the apparent oversight of the 1855 Act, there is no
indication why criminal proceedings were not also included.
61. Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 95, 12 Stat. 769. See supra note 58 for the text of the statute
in pertinent part.
62. See Janssen v. Belding Corticelli, Ltd., 84 F.2d 577, 579 (3d Cir. 1936) (lacking an
express statutory grant, federal courts do not have the power to issue the subpoena duces
tecum needed to order the production of the evidence requested); In re Letters Rogatory from
Examining Magistrate of the Tribunal of Versailles, Fr., 26 F. Supp. 852, 853 (D. Md. 1939)
(refusing to grant judicial assistance for a criminal proceeding stating that the court's jurisdic-
tion is limited to civil suits); In re Letters Rogatory from the First Dist. Judge of Vera Cruz, 36
F. 306, 306 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1888) (refusing to grant judicial assistance because it was not ap-
parent from the letters rogatory that the testimony was to be used in "a suit for the recovery of
money or property"); cf The Signe, 37 F. Supp. 819, 821-22 (E.D. La. 1941) (refusing to grant
the execution of a letters rogatory issued by the Supreme Court of the Russian Soviet Feder-
ated Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, because the latter lacked legal
jurisdiction over the resident of Estonia, whose deposition was being sought). Ironically,
United States courts were particularly hostile towards requests for testimony for use in foreign
criminal proceedings, the original impetus behind the enactment of letters rogatory legislation.
Jones, supra note 10, at 541. See Letter of Circuit Judge Morrow to the Mexican Consul
General, Apr. 9, 1909, 3 AM. J. INT'L L. 1011, 1011-13 (1909) (informing the Mexican Consul
General that United States law did not authorize federal judges to take the deposition of a
witness to be used in a criminal case pursuant to a letters rogatory request).
63. LETrERS ROGATORY, supra note 8, at 50 (remarks of Samuel M. Fink) (explaining
how the growth in international commerce since the end of World War II has been "directly
responsible for a marked increase in litigation in American courts, where either parties or
witnesses may be present in those foreign jurisdictions").
64. Jones, supra note 10, at 558 (explaining how the surge in "international". litigation
following World War II revealed the inadequacy of our extraterritorial procedures); Smit,
supra note 22, at 1015 (attributing the growth in international litigation to the increase in
international commerce).
65. Pub. L. No. 773, 62 Stat. 869, 949 (1948).
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encompass all civil actions pending in any court of the foreign country.6 6
Second, Congress deleted the requirement that the foreign government be a
party to or have an interest in the case. 67 In 1949, Congress further liberal-
ized the statute by replacing the restrictive phrase "civil action" with "any
judicial proceeding pending in any court in a foreign country., 68 Unfortu-
nately, the lack of statutory procedures under which courts could provide
assistance created confusion and inconsistency regarding the timing and
scope of assistance available under § 1782.69
In 1958, following increased debate and criticism of judicial assistance
given and received by the United States,7 ° Congress created a Commission
on International Rules of Judicial Procedure, along with an Advisory Com-
mittee,7' to "investigate and study existing practices of judicial assistance
66. Id. (allowing for the compelled production of evidence from "any witness residing
within the United States to be used in any civil action pending in any court in a foreign country
with which the United States is at peace") (emphasis added). Again, there is no indication
why assistance was not authorized in criminal cases as well.
67. Id.
68. Pub. L. No. 72, 63 Stat. 89, 103 (1949) (deleting the requirement that the witness be
"residing" in the United States and replacing the words "civil action" with "judicial proceed-
ing") (emphasis added). Consistent with the 1855 Act, the amended statute allowed for the
execution of letters rogatory for use in foreign criminal proceedings. See Jones, supra note 10,
at 542. This amendment, however, did not allow the execution of a request issued by an
investigating magistrate, such as the French juge d'instruction. LETTERS ROGATORY, supra
note 8, at 14.
69. See Jones, supra note 19, at 88 (explaining that "there is no statute or rule of court
expressly authorizing a certain procedure" governing international judicial assistance).
"American courts are deprived of adequate overseas assistance at a time when tribunals hear
an unprecedented volume of litigation involving international complications." Jones, supra
note 10, at 516.
70. For example, a symposium conducted by the Consular Law Society on letters roga-
tory in 1956 generated sharp criticism of the current procedures employed by the United
States regarding the execution of letters rogatory. LETTERS ROGATORY, supra note 8, at 63
(remarks of Samuel M. Fink) (explaining the frustration encountered by foreign courts when
requesting evidence located within the United States). Lack of procedural authority and reli-
ance primarily on the concept of comity enabled courts to refuse to execute letters rogatory at
a time when such assistance was becoming increasingly essential throughout the world. LET-
TERS ROGATORY, supra note 8, at 11. At the same time, those criticizing American proce-
dures recognized that the United States must be less than satisfied with foreign execution of its
own letters rogatory as well. Jones, supra note 10, at 516. The consensus of the symposium, as
well as other discussions on the subject, was that changes were necessary; specifically, that
procedures adapted to the increasing need for foreign evidence gathering should be developed.
See LETrERS ROGATORY, supra note 8, at 34 (remarks of George Yamaoka) (endorsing sug-
gestions to facilitate international judicial assistance in the United States through legislation
and treaties).
71. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 23, at ix-xii. The members of both the Commission and
Advisory Committee comprised a superlative collection of international legal scholars, indicat-
ing an intentional decision to entrust the investigation and drafting of legislation essential to
the improvement of international judicial assistance to experts in the field, who were selected
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and cooperation between the United States and foreign countries with a view
to achieving improvements. ' 72 In addition, Congress conferred upon the
Commission the task of drafting and recommending any legislation neces-
sary to accomplish this goal." In 1960, the Commission was joined by the
"Columbia Project" following Congress' failure to appropriate the funds
necessary to finance the Commission's work.7 4
In the ensuing years, staffs of the Commission and the Columbia Project
studied United States procedures involving international judicial assist-
ance. 75 A drafting committee, established by the Commission and made up
of members of the Columbia Project and certain members of the Advisory
Committee, drafted proposed amendments to federal statutes to effectuate
improvements 76 and recommended unprecedented revisions of several fed-
eral statutes, including 28 U.S.C. § 1782.77 On November 9, 1962, the Com-
by Congress. The following are only some of the esteemed members of the Commission and
Advisory Committee: Oscar Cox, Chairman of the Commission, member of the firm of Cox
Langford & Brown, Washington, D.C. and formerly General Counsel to the Foreign Eco-
nomic Administration; Archibald Cox, Solicitor General, Department of Justice and formerly
Professor of Law, Harvard Law School; Michael A. Musmanno, Justice, Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania and formerly Judge, International War Crimes Tribunal II, Nuremberg, Ger-
many; Bethvel M. Webster, member of the firm of Webster, Sheffield & Chrystie, New York,
New York, member of Permanent Court of Arbitration, The Hague, and formerly President,
The Association of the Bar of the City of New York; Philip W. Amram, Chairman of the
Advisory Committee, member of the firm of Amram, Hahn & Sundlun, Washington, D.C.,
and Chairman, Civil Procedural Rules Committee, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania; Albert A.
Ehrenzweig, Professor of Law, University of California Law School, Berkeley, California and
formerly Professor of Law, University of Vienna, Austria and Judge of the Austrian Courts;
James J. Robinson, Justice, Supreme Court of Libya, Tripoli, Libya and formerly Reporter,
Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See id.
72. Pub. L. No. 85-906, 72 Stat. 1743 (1958). Congress' objective was to make assistance
"more readily ascertainable, efficient, economical, and expeditious, and . . . [to improve] the
procedures of our State and Federal tribunals for the rendering of assistance to foreign courts
and quasi-judicial agencies." Id.
73. Id.
74. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 23, at 2. In its Second Annual Report to Congress in
1959, the Commission explained that, due to Congress' failure to appropriate funds, the Com-
mission had sought funds from private sources in order to accomplish its task. Id. In April,
1960, the Carnegie Corporation made a $350,000 grant to Columbia University Law School,
part of which was used for research and drafting by the Commission. Id. Columbia Law
School established a Project on International Procedure "as an instrumentality for administer-
ing the grant and for collaborating with the Commission and its Advisory Committee." Id
The "Columbia Project" was directed by Professor Hans Smit of Columbia University Law
School. Id. at 3.
75. See id. at 2-3; Smit, supra note 22, at 1015-16.
76. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 23, at 3. Distinguished members of the Drafting Group
included, among others, Philip W. Amram, Chairman of the Advisory Committee; Harry L.
Jones, Director of the Commission; Professor Hans Smit, Director of the Columbia Project;
and Professor Arthur Miller, Associate Director of the Columbia Project. See id.
77. See id. at 4-8 (listing the proposed statutory amendments).
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mission approved the final text of the proposed amendments to improve
procedures for executing requests for judicial assistance within the United
States as well as the historical and explanatory notes which accompanied
them.78 In 1964, the Commission submitted a proposed bill and its final
report to the President and to Congress.79 The bill was passed without de-
bate and signed into law.8 ° While there is little legislative history regarding
the proposals ultimately adopted by Congress, the intent of Congress when it
adopted them is clear: 8 Congress intended to remove "all unnecessary ob-
stacles" encountered in executing foreign requests for judicial assistance in
this country.8 2
C. The 1964 Amendments to § 1782
Prior to the enactment of § 1782 in 1964, United States district courts
were authorized to take "[t]he deposition of any witness residing within the
United States to be used in any civil action pending in any court in a foreign
Until recently, the United States has not engaged itself fully in efforts to improve
practices of international cooperation in litigation. The steadily growing involve-
ment of the United States in international intercourse and the resulting increase in
litigation with international aspects have demonstrated the necessity for statutory
improvements and other devices to facilitate the conduct of such litigation.
Id. at 19; see also SENATE REPORT, supra note 23, at 13 (urging Congress to adopt the recom-
mended amendments).
78. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 23, at 6. At the same time, the Commission hoped to
encourage other countries to do the same. Amram, supra note 20, at 28 (quoting the House
and Senate Reports) (" 'It is hoped that the initiative taken by the United States in improving
its procedures will invite foreign countries similarly to adjust their procedures' ") (emphasis
omitted).
79. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 23, at v.
80. No debate on record exists in either the House or the Senate. According to Professor
Smit, there was no debate on the bill because Congress relied so heavily on the work of the
Commission and Advisory Committee to determine what was necessary to improve existing
procedures. Telephone Interview with Hans Smit, Professor, Columbia University Law
School (Sept. 26, 1991). When the proposals were finally submitted to Congress, they were
passed by both houses "without encountering any objection." Smit, supra note 22, at 1017
(emphasis added). Finally, on October 3, 1964, President Johnson approved the amended leg-
islation. Id. at 1016.
81. See Brazil III, 936 F.2d 702, 705-06 (2d Cir. 1991). The legislative history available is
limited to the House and Senate Reports. See House Report, supra note 23, at 43-47; Senate
Report, supra note 23, at 7-9. In addition, insight into the intended scope and operation of the
law is provided in two articles authored respectively by Philip W. Amram, Chairman of the
Advisory Committee to the Commission, and Hans Smit, the chief draftsman of the 1964
amendments. See generally Amram, supra note 20; Smit, supra note 22.
82. Smit, supra note 22, at 1017-18 (explaining that "[a] nation should object to the per-
formance of foreign procedural acts within its borders only if its interest in doing so outweighs
its interest in promoting the administration of justice on the international level") (emphasis
added).
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country with which the United States is at peace." 3 In 1964, two critical
changes were made to broaden the scope of this requirement, which have
been subject to considerable judicial scrutiny over the years.84
The first amendment to § 1782 authorizes federal district courts to exe-
cute letters rogatory requests provided that the evidence sought is "for use in
a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal." 5 The Commission pur-
posely replaced the restrictive word "court," found in the 1949 version of
§ 1782, with the phrase "foreign or international tribunal",6 in order "to
make it clear that assistance is not confined to proceedings before conven-
tional courts."'8 1 Unfortunately, Congress' failure to define the meaning of
"tribunal" has caused considerable confusion among litigants and the courts.
The second amendment, also a source of significant litigation, deleted the
word "pending" from the statute.88 Based on this change, it is no longer
necessary for a proceeding to be pending before a foreign or international
tribunal. Instead, the statute requires that the requested information merely
be "for use" in a proceeding, not that the proceeding be currently under-
83. Pub. L. No. 773, 62 Stat. 869, 949 (1948).
84. In addition, there were other important changes made to § 1782. The statute now
makes clear that federal courts can compel not only the testimony of witnesses found in the
United States, but also the production of documents under the witnesses' control. See HOUSE
REPORT, supra note 23, at 45; SENATE REPORT, supra note 23, at 8. The Commission recog-
nized that the need for "tangible evidence" in a judicial proceeding, such as bank records or
financial statements, may be just as critical as the need for oral testimony. SENATE REPORT,
supra note 23, at 7. Furthermore, the requirement that the request emanate from a country
with whom the United States is at peace was deleted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782. This restriction
was eliminated because, in light of the amount of discretion given to courts in deciding
whether to execute a request, the Commission did not believe the restriction had any real
significance. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 23, at 45 (leaving the execution of the letters
rogatory to the discretion of the court "which, in proper cases, may refuse to issue an order or
may impose conditions it deems desirable"); see also SENATE REPORT, supra note 23, at 8.
The Commission also acknowledged that, in the event a request came from a country with
which the United States was at war, the relations of the United States would be regulated by
the Trading with the Enemy Act. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 23, at 46.
85. 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1988).
86. See id. (emphasis added).
87. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 23, at 45. The legislative history explains that the
statute grants courts the discretion to provide assistance when the proceedings are pending
before investigating magistrates, such as the French juge d'instruction. Id.
88. There is no discussion in the House or Senate Reports explaining why the word
"pending" was dropped. However, according to Professor Smit, Director of the Columbia
Project and chief draftsman of § 1782, the word "pending" was dropped because it was
deemed unnecessary for a proceeding to be pending. Telephone Interview with Hans Smit,
Professor, Columbia Law School (Sept. 26, 1991); see also Smit, supra note 22, at 1026 ("It is
not necessary ... for a proceeding to be pending at the time the evidence is sought, but only
that the evidence is eventually to be used in such a proceeding.").
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way.8 9 However, this change has created new problems. Since Congress
failed to explain the deletion of the word "pending," courts have imposed
inconsistent standards regarding how likely a proceeding must be in order to
fall within the purview of § 1782.90
II. THE JUDICIARY'S RESPONSE TO § 1782
United States courts have routinely executed both civil and criminal let-
ters rogatory since the expansion of § 1782 in 1964.9 Most requests are
executed without difficulty, and there are few reported decisions involving
challenges to their sufficiency. In recent years, however, federal courts have
encountered substantial litigation concerning § 1782. The reported cases in-
dicate that these courts are increasingly less receptive to foreign requests for
information pertaining to potential violations of the requesting jurisdiction's
criminal laws if the requests are made before formal charges are actually
brought.92 Numerous challenges have arisen in cases where no formal
charges are currently pending and evidence is requested in conjunction with
an investigation of activities that may lead to criminal charges.9 3
89. 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1988). For the text of the statute, see supra text accompanying note
27.
90. See supra note 32 (describing the three standards currently employed by courts).
91. There are only thirteen MLATs currently in force. See supra note 4. In the absence
of a treaty or some kind of executive agreement creating an obligation on the part of the
requested party to produce testimonial or documentary evidence, countries primarily rely on
the execution of letters rogatory to gather evidence. See Sandi R. Murphy, Note, Drug Diplo-
macy and the Supply-Side Strategy: A Survey of United States Practice, 43 VAND. L. REV.
1259, 1301 (1990) (discussing the use of MLATs and noting that the "traditional method of
obtaining evidence . .. [remains] letters rogatory"). In addition, the principal means of ob-
taining evidence for use in the investigation and prosecution of economic crimes crossing
transnational borders, such as money laundering or fraud, are requests for the execution of
letters rogatory. See Clark, supra note 22, at 53.
92. Common law systems on the whole tend to refuse assistance when the case is still in
the investigative stage. Clark, supra note 22, at 53-54.
93. See, e.g., Brazil I, 936 F.2d 702, 707 (2d Cir. 1991) (denying assistance to a Brazilian
court after determining that formal charges, i.e., an adjudicatory proceeding, were not "immi-
nent"); Crown Prosecution, 870 F.2d 686, 694 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (granting assistance to the
Crown Prosecution Service because judicial proceedings were within reasonable contempla-
tion); Trinidad & Tobago, 848 F.2d 1151, 1155-56 (1 1th Cir. 1988) (executing a letters roga-
tory because formal adjudicatory proceedings were very likely to occur), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
1005 (1989); Fonseca v. Blumenthal, 620 F.2d 322, 323-24 (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (deny-
ing assistance to the Superintendent of the Exchange Control of Colombia because he lacked
sufficient impartiality to be considered a "tribunal" within the meaning of § 1782); In re Re-
quest for Judicial Assistance from the Seoul District Criminal Court, Seoul, Korea, 555 F.2d
720, 723 (9th Cir. 1977) (granting judicial assistance where the request was made by a foreign
or international tribunal and the testimony or material requested was for use in a proceeding
before the tribunal); Tokyo, 539 F.2d 1216, 1219 (9th Cir. 1976) (executing a letters rogatory
where the information sought from witnesses in the United States was for use in criminal
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While there seems to be a general consensus that under § 1782 the foreign
proceeding need not be pending, courts have imposed substantial, and at
times conflicting, restrictions on the ability of foreign governments to make
requests under such circumstances. 94 Two issues generally arise when a for-
eign government makes a request for judicial assistance. First, the court
must determine the nature of the foreign proceeding currently pending in the
requesting country.9" Second, in the absence of a pending adjudicative pro-
ceeding, the court must determine the likelihood of such a proceeding taking
place in the future.96 Based on the various interpretations of these two is-
sues, the court may or may not grant the request.
A. The Nature of the Request
Section 1782 provides that a request for judicial assistance may be made
by a "foreign or international tribunal, or upon the application of any inter-
ested person."9 7 In addition, the statute requires that the evidence be "for
use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal."98 United States
courts generally agree that Congress intended to grant assistance for pro-
ceedings other than those before a conventional court, such as those con-
ducted by an investigating magistrate. 99 Courts, however, have struggled to
determine exactly what types of proceedings are appropriate under the stat-
ute. While some courts narrowly interpret this requirement relying solely on
the "tribunal" language of § 1782, other courts employ the "interested per-
investigations and in subsequent criminal trials in Japan); Montreal, 523 F.2d 562, 565 (6th
Cir. 1975) (authorizing the execution of letters rogatory requesting evidence sought for use in a
foreign criminal proceeding); Manitoba II, 488 F.2d 511, 512 (9th Cir. 1973) (refusing to grant
judicial assistance in response to a letters rogatory when the requesting party's sole purpose
was to conduct an investigation unrelated to a judicial or quasi-judicial controversy); India,
385 F.2d 1017, 1020 (2d Cir. 1967) (denying a request from an Indian income tax officer
because the officer was not a "tribunal" within the meaning of § 1782); In re Letter of Request
for Judicial Assistance from the Tribunal Civil de Port-Au-Prince, Rep. of Haiti, 669 F. Supp.
403, 405-06 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (holding that judicial assistance should be granted when a pro-
ceeding is before a foreign administrative or quasi-judicial tribunal, or before an investigating
magistrate).
94. See infra notes 194-196.
95. See Brazil II1, 936 F.2d at 705. The inquiry into the nature of the proceeding entails
determining the purpose for which the evidence is requested to ensure that the request is made
by a party authorized under the statute to make such a request. See also infra notes 97-145
and accompanying text.
96. See Brazil 111, 936 F.2d at 705-06.
97. 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1988).
98. Id.
99. See, e.g., Tokyo, 539 F.2d 1216, 1219 (9th Cir. 1976) (recognizing that Congress in-
tended to authorize assistance to foreign investigating magistrates). See also infra notes 110-
I I and accompanying text.
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son" doctrine, recognizing that Congress' expansion of § 1782 in 1964 makes
clear that a request need not originate in a tribunal.
1. What Constitutes a Tribunal-The Second Circuit and The
Impartiality Test
The first case interpreting the "tribunal" language of § 1782 reached the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 1967.10 In re
Letters Rogatory Issued By the Director of Inspection of the Government of
India presented the issue of whether an Indian income tax officer was con-
sidered a "tribunal" within the meaning of § 1782.1' The case arose out of
a letters rogatory issued by the Director of Inspection under the Govern-
ment of India's Income Tax Act, 10 2 requesting the production of documents
from Chase Manhattan Bank and Brown Brothers, Harriman & Co. to be
used in a tax assessment pending in India.' °3 The United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York found that the Indian income
tax officer was a "tribunal" within the meaning of § 1782 and issued a sub-
poena ordering production of the documents.1°4
On appeal, the Second Circuit interpreted the word "tribunal," as used in
§ 1782, to mandate that the party requesting the evidence be impartial.' 5
The Second Circuit held that the party requesting the evidence, the Indian
income tax officer, was not an impartial tribunal as required by § 1782.'06
The court, therefore, denied the request for assistance. 10 7 The Second Cir-
cuit reasoned that while § 1782, as amended, gives courts substantial discre-
tionary power,'0 8 it does not give courts carte blanche authority to execute
100. India, 385 F.2d 1017, 1019-20 (2d Cir. 1967).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1017.
103. Id. at 1017-18. The request stated that the documents "might be relevant to the deter-
mination of the amount ... [that] should be assessed [in taxes]." Id. at 1018.
104. Id. at 1019. A motion to quash the subpoena was subsequently denied and an appeal
to the Second Circuit followed. Id. at 1018.
105. Id. at 1020-21 (requiring a requesting party to show some degree of impartiality).
106. Id. at 1020.
107. Id. at 1020-21.
108. Id. at 1020. The court traced the evolution of § 1782 from 1863 through its most
recent amendment in 1964, and interpreted the rationale underlying the latest amendments to
demonstrate the liberalization of the statutory language over the years. See id. at 1018, 1019
(explaining that the statute authorized courts to execute foreign requests for assistance for a
"'suit for the recovery of money or property depending in any court in any foreign country',
12 Stat. 769 (1863), 'in any civil action pending in any court in a foreign country', 62 Stat. 949
(1948) '... in any judicial proceeding pending in any court in a foreign country', 63 Stat. 103
(1949)," and finally "'for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal,' " 28
U.S.C. § 1782). This statute leaves the decision of whether to provide assistance and what
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letters rogatory whenever a foreign country requests assistance."° Instead,
the court stated that in order for the requesting party to qualify as a "tribu-
nal" within the meaning of § 1782, it must show some degree of separation
between its prosecutorial and adjudicative functions.110
The Indian income tax officer failed to satisfy Judge Friendly's "impartial-
ity" test. Unlike the Frenchjuge submitting the request in 1854, who had no
interest in the outcome of the case, 1 the Indian income tax officer's sole
responsibility was to assess and recover a tax on behalf of the Government of
India." 2 Therefore, the officer could not request judicial assistance under
§ 1782.113
The India impartiality test was subsequently reaffirmed by the Second Cir-
cuit in Fonseca v. Blumenthal. 4 In Fonseca, the Colombian Exchange Con-
trol requested the return of a suitcase containing $250,000 in United States
currency, which had been seized by the United States Customs Service upon
its arrival at John F. Kennedy Airport in New York. "' Fonseca brought an
action to recover his suitcase"16 and, while that action was pending, the Su-
perintendent of the Colombian Exchange Control made his request." 7
The Second Circuit, in a per curiam opinion, held that the Superintendent
was not a "tribunal" within the meaning of § 1782. "' Referring to its anal-
kind of assistance is appropriate "to the discretion of the court, which ... may refuse to issue
an order or may impose conditions it deems desirable." SENATE REPORT, supra note 23, at 7.
109. India, 385 F.2d at 1020.
110. Id. at 1021. Judge Friendly recognized that the term "tribunal" was used to enable
courts to respond to the increased number of requests issued by investigating magistrates, and
the growth in administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings throughout the world. Id. at 1020
(citing SENATE REPORT, supra note 23, at 7). However, the Court was not willing to extend
this qualification to any entity claiming to fall within the purview of the statute. Id. at 1021.
Instead, the court held that the requesting party must have some degree of neutrality. Id.
11. Id. at 1020. The juge acts as the equivalent of the grand jury in the United States, in
that he decides whether there is sufficient evidence to bring the accused to trial. Id. Thejuge
also performs certain prosecutorial functions, such as directing the investigation and question-
ing the witnesses. Id. However, while the juge performs prosecutorial functions, he has no
interest in the outcome of the case other than " 'to ensure that justice is done.'" Id. (quoting
A.E. Anton, L'Instruction Criminelle, 9 AM. J. COMP. L. 441, 443 (1960)).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1021. In addition, the court pointed to the fact that most United States legisla-
tors would not view a tax assessor as a tribunal. It distinguished between the assessment of
taxes from proceedings where "the sovereign affords 'the taxpayer an opportunity at some
stage to have mistakes rectified.'" Id. at 1021 (quoting Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247,
259-60 (1935)).
114. 620 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
115. Id.
116. Fonseca alleged that the airline "misdirected" his suitcase while he was traveling from
Bogota, Colombia to Lima, Peru. Id.
117. Id. at 322-23.
118. Id. at 323.
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ysis in India, the Second Circuit reasoned that "Congress intended 'tribunal'
to have an adjudicatory connotation." 1 9 Therefore, a foreign entity must
have some attributes of an impartial adjudicator in order to be considered a
tribunal.1 2' The Superintendent failed this test because the court found his
position to be inherently partial; his sole responsibility was "to act in the
[Colombian] government's interest to enforce the law."'' Accordingly, the
request was denied.
122
In these cases, the Second Circuit ruled solely on the issue of what consti-
tutes a "tribunal" under § 1782. The court determined that if the entity
making the request was not an "impartial adjudicator" assistance should not
be granted. The court implicitly based its conclusion on the following prem-
ise: If the request did not come from an impartial adjudicative authority, the
evidence was not "for use in a foreign or international tribunal."
' 123
2. Interested Person-The Alternative to the Tribunal Requirement
Other courts interpret § 1782's definition of "proceeding" differently.
These courts examine whether the evidence is "for use in a proceeding," as
contemplated under the statute, instead of automatically reaching a conclu-
sion based solely on whether the requesting party is a "tribunal." '124 There-
fore, if the evidence is requested by a "tribunal" or an "interested person,"
and is "for use in a proceeding," the request generally will be granted.
The decision in In re Letters of Request to Examine Witnesses From the
Court of the Queen's Bench for Manitoba, Canada (Manitoba ), 125 while not
directly addressing the issue of what constitutes an "interested person," sug-
gested that a court's inquiry should not end with a determination of whether
the requesting party is a "tribunal." The court supported its interpretation
of the proper analysis under § 1782 by suggesting that an interested person
may request the production of evidence that will be used in a proceeding. 
12 6
119. Id.
120. See id. at 324.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See India, 385 F.2d 1017, 1020-21 (2d Cir. 1967); Fonseca 620 F.2d at 323-24. At the
time of the India and Fonseca decisions, it appears that the court and the litigants assumed
that the requesting party had to qualify as a "tribunal" under § 1782, because no argument
was made for, and the court did not address, the possibility of an "interested person" making
the request.
124. First, these courts determine if the party making the request is impartial and qualifies
as a "tribunal" under the statute. Second, if the requesting party is not a tribunal, these courts
ascertain whether the requesting party is an "interested person." Finally, the courts determine
whether the evidence sought is "for use in a proceeding" as required by § 1782.
125. 59 F.R.D. 625, 629 (N.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd per curiam, 488 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1973).
126. See id.
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In Manitoba I, the Canadian Commission of Inquiry caused the Court of
Queen's Bench for Manitoba, Canada, to issue a letters rogatory for testi-
mony regarding a multi-million dollar forestry and industrial project in
Manitoba, Canada.1 27 The request was forwarded to a federal district court
in California, which subsequently denied the requested assistance. 128 The
district court recognized that the Canadian court qualified as a tribunal,
29
but denied the request because it was made on behalf of another body whose
purpose was to conduct an investigation unrelated to a judicial or quasi-
judicial proceeding.'" 0 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling in a per curiam decision in Mani-
toba 1.131
In In re Letters Rogatory From the Tokyo District, Tokyo, Japan (To-
kyo), 132 the Ninth Circuit again focused on the purpose of the evidence
rather than who was requesting it. In Tokyo, the Tokyo District Court in
Japan issued a letters rogatory to a federal district court in California on
behalf of the Tokyo public prosecutor who was investigating alleged im-
proper payments from a United States corporation and its officers and agents
to Japanese citizens. 133 The request sought assistance in taking in camera
depositions "to be used in criminal investigations and possible future crimi-
nal trials in Japan."' 34 The district court found that the letters rogatory
satisfied § 1782 and granted the request.
135
The Ninth Circuit, without directly addressing whether the Tokyo Dis-
trict Court was acting as a tribunal in this case,' 36 held that the evidence was
"for use in a proceeding" before a tribunal and affirmed the district court's
127. Id. The Commission was authorized "'to enquire into, ascertain and report upon the
facts and circumstances relating to the development of the forestry and industrial complex...
[and] to make recommendations.'" Id. at 512 (quoting Order of Feb. 6, 1973, which created
the Manitoba Commission of Inquiry).
128. Id.
129. By definition, a "tribunal" is some type of court. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1350 (5th ed. 1979) (defining "tribunal" as "the place where [a judge] administers justice.., a
judicial court").
130. Manitoba I, 59 F.R.D. at 629. The Commission's purpose was specifically to conduct
an investigation and report to the legislative branch of the Canadian government. Id.
131. 488 F.2d 511, 512 (9th Cir. 1973). The Ninth Circuit quoted the district court's deci-
sion, stating that" '§ 1782 was not intended to and does not authorize the United States courts
to compel testimony on behalf of foreign governmental bodies whose purpose is to conduct
investigations unrelated to judicial or quasi-judicial controversies.'" Id. at 512 (quoting the
district court).
132. 539 F.2d 1216 (9th Cir. 1976).
133. Id. at 1218.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1217.
136. Relying primarily on Manitoba I, the witnesses argued that the Tokyo District Court,
while technically a "tribunal," was not acting as an "adjudicatory body" in this case because
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decision to grant the request. 37 Recognizing that Congress intended to
broaden the power of district courts to respond to letters rogatory, 138 the
court again took a more liberal approach than the India court in defining the
nature of the request. After examining the legislative history surrounding
the 1964 amendments to § 1782, and concluding that Congress intended to
provide assistance to foreign investigating magistrates,' 39 the panel analyzed
the Japanese judicial system and the nature of the Tokyo District Court's
role in making the request. " The Ninth Circuit determined that the re-
quest satisfied the requirements of § 1782 because the Tokyo District Court
issued the letters rogatory on behalf of a Tokyo public prosecutor whose
investigation was related to a judicial or quasi-judicial controversy. 14' Un-
like India, the determinative issue in Tokyo was not whether the Tokyo Dis-
trict Court was a "tribunal" within the meaning of § 1782; rather, the Ninth
Circuit focused on the question of whether the evidence was "for use in a
proceeding before a foreign or international tribunal."'
142
Through its decisions in Manitoba II and Tokyo, the Ninth Circuit alerted
future litigants that a letters rogatory will not automatically be executed sim-
ply because it comes from a "tribunal."'' 43 Instead, the evidence requested
must be "for use in a proceeding" as contemplated under § 1782.'" This
trend away from the India court's exclusive reliance on the tribunal require-
its purpose was to conduct an investigation in the absence of a judicial or quasi-judicial contro-
versy. Id.
137. Tokyo, 539 F.2d at 1217-18. In reaching its decision, the court looked to the legisla-
tive history of § 1782 and examined the role of the Tokyo District Court in issuing the request.
Id. at 1218-19. The court concluded that while the Tokyo prosecutor initiated the request, the
Tokyo District Court actually determines "whether or not an investigation is entitled to judi-
cial assistance." Id. at 1219.
138. See id. at 1218-19.
139. Id. at 1218 (citing the House Report accompanying the amendments to § 1782, see
supra note 23). The court also acknowledged that in the past, United States district courts
have issued letters rogatory to foreign countries requesting evidence for use in a grand jury
proceeding. Id. at 1219.
140. See supra note 137.
141. Tokyo, 539 F.2d at 1220. Although the court applied the rule adopted in Manitoba II,
it nevertheless held that the facts in Manitoba II were distinguishable. Id. In Manitoba II, the
Ninth Circuit's refusal to grant assistance stemmed from the fact that the Canadian Commis-
sion of Inquiry's investigation was unrelated to a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding. Mani-
toba II, 488 F.2d 511, 512 (9th Cir. 1973). In Tokyo, however, the Tokyo District Court was
investigating possible criminal activity and requested evidence that would be used in future
criminal trials in Japan. Tokyo, 539 F.2d at 1217. Therefore, the investigation was closely
related to a judicial proceeding.
142. Tokyo, 539 F.2d at 1218.
143. See Manitoba II, 488 F.2d at 512 (denying assistance to a foreign court which issued a
letters rogatory on behalf of an investigative body whose purpose was unrelated to a judicial
proceeding).
144. See Tokyo, 539 F.2d at 1219.
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ment has continued. Several decisions since Manitoba and Tokyo grant
assistance when the requesting party issues the letters rogatory as an "inter-
ested person" and the evidence is "for use in a judicial proceeding."' 45 The
analysis, however, does not end here. While these cases meet the statutory
requirements for a requesting party, courts must further consider how likely
the judicial proceeding will be in order to grant the requested assistance.
B. A Likely Proceeding Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782
When Congress amended § 1782 in 1964, the word "pending" was
dropped from the statute without explanation. '46 The courts generally agree
that this change negates the requirement that a proceeding actually be
"pending" at the time of the request for assistance. 47 Given that a proceed-
ing need not be "pending," the circuit courts have struggled to determine
how likely a proceeding must be in order to qualify it for assistance under
§ 1782. There are currently three standards employed by the circuit courts,
each of which sets different limits on the ability of district courts to render
judicial assistance.
14 8
1. Trinidad & Tobago-The "Very Likely to Occur" Standard
In Trinidad & Tobago, ' the United States Court of Appeals for the Elev-
enth Circuit directly addressed the issue of timing in the absence of a pend-
ing proceeding.' 5 ' The court recognized that § 1782 does not require a
pending proceeding in order to execute a foreign request for judicial assist-
145. See Crown Prosecution, 870 F.2d 686, 687 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (treating the Crown Prose-
cution Service as an "interested person" within the meaning of § 1782 in order to grant the
requested assistance); Trinidad & Tobago, 848 F.2d 1151, 1155-56 (1 1th Cir. 1988) (granting
assistance to the Attorney General and Minister of Legal Affairs of Trinidad and Tobago who
qualified as an "interested person" under the statute), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1005 (1989). See
also infra notes 154, 177 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 88.
147. See Brazil III, 936 F.2d 702, 705-07 (2d Cir. 1991) (acknowledging the deletion of the
word "pending" from § 1782 before adopting the imminence standard); Crown Prosecution,
870 F.2d at 690 (quoting Professor Smit, explaining that it is unnecessary for a proceeding to
be pending to execute a letters rogatory request); Trinidad & Tobago, 848 F.2d at 1152 (hold-
ing that § 1782 does not require a proceeding to be pending at the time of the request); Tokyo,
539 F.2d at 1219 (acknowledging Congress' intent to permit assistance for investigating
magistrates).
148. See infra notes 194-196 for the three prevailing standards currently employed.
149. 848 F.2d 1151 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1005 (1989).
150. Id. In 1976, the Ninth Circuit alluded to the fact that a pending proceeding is not
always necessary for the execution of a letters rogatory. Tokyo, 539 F.2d 1216, 1217 (9th Cir.
1976) (ordering depositions of witnesses for use "in criminal investigations and possible future
criminal trials in Japan"). While the Tokyo court did not specifically address the "pending"
issue, the fact that proceedings were not pending at the time of the request indicates the court's
recognition that a "pending proceeding" was no longer a requirement under § 1782. Id.
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ance." m The court concluded, however, that a proceeding must be "very
likely to occur" to satisfy the requirements of § 1782.132 The court further
restricted requests for evidence which were for use in such a proceeding. I" 3
In Trinidad & Tobago, the Attorney General and Minister of Legal Af-
fairs in Trinidad and Tobago requested bank records in connection with a
criminal investigation of violations of a local Exchange Control Act by citi-
zens of Trinidad and Tobago.' 54 Joseph Azar, the target of the investiga-
tion, argued that when a request is made by a foreign official as an
"interested person," the proceeding must already be pending.'33 The Elev-
enth Circuit, after analyzing the legislative history of § 1782,156 rejected this
argument and granted the request.""
The panel set forth a two-part test to determine the circumstances under
which judicial assistance could be granted pursuant to a letters rogatory.
First, the district judge must conclude that the requesting party is an "inter-
ested person" or "tribunal" within the meaning of the statute. 5 ' Second,
"the evidence [must be] . . . 'for use in a proceeding' as required by
§ 1782."' 5' The court refused to make § 1782 applicable to all requests sub-
151. Trinidad & Tobago, 848 F.2d at 1155 ("We believe that Congress' elimination of the
word 'pending' . . . compels us to conclude.., that a pending proceeding is not absolutely
necessary.").
152. Id. at 1156.
153. Id. at 1155. The court stated that the decision to grant assistance will not depend on
whether the proceeding is pending, but the likelihood that the requested evidence will be used
in a judicial proceeding. Id. (citing Professor Smit).
154. Id. at 1152. The Minister requested the information as an "interested person" under
§ 1782.
155. Id. at 1155. Azar pointed to the use of the word "litigant" in the legislative history of
§ 1782. Id. He claimed that the word "litigant" denoted Congress' intent only to authorize
courts "to provide assistance to an 'interested person' who is presently involved in a pending
proceeding." Id.
156. Id. at 1152-54. The court analyzed the development of the statute and concluded that
"the history of Section 1782 reflects a congressional desire to increase the power of district
courts to respond to requests for international assistance." Id. at 1154. The court also relied
on commentary by Professor Smit, stating that the term "interested person" was intended to
include "foreign officials as well as actual litigants." Id.
157. Id. at 1155. The court logically concluded that it is no longer necessary for a proceed-
ing to be pending in order make a request for judicial assistance. Id. The court, in support of
its conclusion, again cited Professor Smit's law review article and stated that " '[i]t is not
necessary.., for the proceeding to be pending at the time the evidence is sought, but only that
the evidence is eventually used in such a proceeding.'" Id. (quoting Smit, supra note 22, at
1027).
158. Id.
159. Id. It is noteworthy that the second part of this test is substantially more liberal than
the "very likely to occur" threshold the court ultimately set. See infra text accompanying note
161. As the court points out, the language of the statute only requires that the evidence re-
quested be "for use in a proceeding." 848 F.2d at 1155 (emphasis added). It does not state the
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mitted by an "interested party" before a judicial proceeding has begun in
order to prevent abuse of the statute by foreign investigative authorities."
In this regard, the court directed the district judge to look at the totality of
the circumstances and "satisfy himself that a proceeding is very likely to
occur." 161
The Eleventh Circuit found that the request by the Minister of Legal Af-
fairs in Trinidad and Tobago met the threshold requirement. 162 First, the
Minister of Legal Affairs qualified as an "interested person" under § 1782
based on his legal responsibility for the enforcement of the Exchange Con-
trol Act. 163 Next, the court considered whether the evidence was "for use in
a proceeding."''
64
The circuit judge looked to the totality of the circumstances and noted
three main factors considered by the district court in reaching its decision to
grant the requested assistance. First, in his request for judicial assistance,
the Minister "set forth the documents he desired, the information he ex-
pected to find, and the reason he would use the documents in the eventual
proceeding."' 16  Second, the Minister requested the evidence in a manner
that would assure its admissibility in any future criminal proceeding con-
ducted in Trinidad and Tobago.166 Finally, the court noted that the Minis-
ter offered to pay certain witnesses to travel to Trinidad and Tobago to
testify to the authenticity of the documents. 167 According to the Eleventh
Circuit, "this suggests that a proceeding is imminent" and allows a reason-
able person to conclude that the evidence would be used in a proceeding as
time period in which the proceeding must occur. See supra text accompanying note 27 for text
of the statute.
160. Trinidad & Tobago, 848 F.2d at 1155. The court was concerned that foreign authori-
ties might attempt to use the statute as a "blanket" approval for execution of letters rogatory,
allowing them to conduct "fishing expeditions" for evidence. Id. at 1156.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1156.
163. Id. at 1155. The panel pointed out that several previous cases indicate that the Minis-
ter could not be classified as a "foreign tribunal" under § 1782. Id. at 1155 n.10 (citing Fon-
seca v. Blumenthal, 620 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (refusing to grant assistance to
the Superintendent of the Exchange Control of Colombia because he did not qualify as a tribu-
nal under the statute); India, 385 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1967) (refusing to recognize the Indian
income tax officer as a tribunal); Manitoba I, 59 F.R.D. 625 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (denying assist-
ance to the Canada Commission of Inquiry because it was not related to a judicial or quasi-
judicial controversy)). According to the panel, this determination had nothing to do with the
Minister's status as an "interested person." Id. The court held that the Minister could be
considered an "interested person," and could properly make a request for judicial assistance in
this matter, provided that he had some measure of legal responsibility. Id.
164. Id. at 1155-56.
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required by § 1782.168 Having satisfied itself that the request was not a
"fishing expedition," the court affirmed the district court's decision to grant
the requested assistance.
169
2. Crown Prosecution-The Reasonable Contemplation Standard
One year later, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia concurred with the Eleventh Circuit's ruling that a foreign proceed-
ing did not have to be pending when the letters rogatory is issued.
170
However, in Crown Prosecution,171 the D.C. Circuit applied a more lenient
standard than the Eleventh Circuit had applied in Trinidad & Tobago. Ac-
cording to the Crown Prosecution court, it "suffices that the proceeding in a
foreign tribunal and its contours be in reasonable contemplation when the
request is made."' 72 Therefore, district court judges must look for "reliable
indications of the likelihood that proceedings will be instituted within a rea-
sonable time."'1
7 1
In Crown Prosecution, the Crown Prosecutor for the United Kingdom is-
sued a letters rogatory seeking the production of evidence regarding the
criminal investigation of a stock manipulation scheme.' 74 The D.C. Circuit,
upon review of the nature of the request, rejected the argument that a pro-
ceeding must be pending at the time of a request.175 The court distinguished
the ruling by the Second Circuit in India, which refused a similar request,
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Crown Prosecution, 870 F.2d 686, 690-91 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The D.C. Circuit also
recognized Congress' desire to facilitate the gathering of evidence for use in a foreign proceed-
ing, and refused to treat the deletion of "pending" as an oversight by Congress. Id. at 691.
The court not only relied on the House and Senate Reports and materials submitted by the
Commission, but like the Ninth Circuit in Trinidad & Tobago, cited the law review article
written by Professor Smit to support its conclusion. Id. at 690. The court concluded that the
drafters eliminated the word "pending" " 'to facilitate the gathering of evidence prior to the
institution of litigation abroad.'" Id. (quoting Smit, supra note 22, at 1026, 1027 n.72) (empha-
sis added). However, as in Trinidad & Tobago, the Crown Prosecution court expressed concern
about the possibility of foreign "fishing expeditions" and stated that it would not endorse
assistance for all future proceedings. See id.
171. 870 F.2d 686 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
172. Id. at 687 (emphasis added).
173. Id. at 692.
174. Id. at 688. The scheme involved several Guinness officials who were accused of
manipulating stocks in order to effect a "takeover by Guinness of the Distillers Company." Id.
Thomas Ward, a Guinness director and the subject of the investigation, argued that because
"the evidence was not sought 'for use in a [judicial] proceeding' as required by § 1782," the
request should not be executed. Id. The district court issued a subpoena ordering the produc-
tion of the requested documents. Id. Ward moved to quash the subpoena. Id. The district
court refused to quash and this appeal followed. Id.
175. Id. at 691.
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because India dealt solely with the issue of what constitutes a tribunal.'7 6
The Crown Prosecutor, however, had applied for judicial assistance as an
"interested person."' 177 The requested evidence was for use against several
individuals in criminal proceedings which, although not currently pending,
were within reasonable contemplation. 178 Because there were reliable indi-
cations that these judicial proceedings would take place within a reasonable
period of time, the Crown Prosecution court executed the letters rogatory
request. '
79
III. BRAZiL III-THE IMMINENCE REQUIREMENT
The Second Circuit's approach in Brazil III " is the most restrictive in-
terpretation yet adopted by a court regarding the standard for letters roga-
tory requests in the absence of a pending proceeding. The decision
substantially limits the ability of district courts to render assistance in for-
eign judicial proceedings.
A. The District Court's Decision
In Brazil III, the district court executed the letters rogatory and ordered
the production of the documentary and testimonial evidence requested by
Brazilian authorities.'' The court reasoned that, although no adjudicatory
176. Id. at 690-91.
177. Id. at 691.
178. Id. at 692. The Court took into account that proceedings had already commenced
against other individuals involved in the alleged stock support scheme. Id. at 691. In addition,
Ward was listed as one of the co-conspirators in the indictment. Id. The court concluded that
the evidence was sought "for use in criminal proceedings in a British court... [and] there is no
question that British courts qualify as tribunals." Id.
179. Id. at 694.
180. 936 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1991).
181. Id. at 703. The original letters rogatory, issued September 24, 1991, was revised and
resubmitted by Brazilian authorities on October 13, 1987. On January 28, 1988, Morgan
Guarantee was ordered to produce account documents controlled by Panamanian corporations
on behalf of Brazilian citizens, from which former Vice-President Gebauer had taken money.
Brazil I, 687 F. Supp. 880, 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). The Panamanian corporations moved to
quash the subpoena duces tecum on the ground that the evidence sought was not "for use in a
proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal" as required by § 1782. Brazil II1, 936 F.2d
at 704. District Judge Haight initially stayed enforcement of the subpoena. Brazil I, 687 F.
Supp. at 886, 887. Judge Haight maintained that the decisive issue in determining whether a
request for judicial assistance may be granted is whether the requested evidence is "for use in a
proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal." Id. at 885. Judge Haight therefore refused
to execute the letters rogatory simply because it was issued by a judge. Id. Instead, he re-
quested further affidavits from both parties to determine "whether the Brazilian court auto-
matically forwards such prosecutorial letters rogatory, or whether there is a 'proceeding'
presently before the Brazilian court which requires that court to exercise an independent adju-
dicative function," as set forth in India. Id. (emphasis added).
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judicial criminal proceeding was currently pending in Brazil,"8 2 one was
"probable" given the totality of the circumstances. Therefore, Judge Haight
granted the requested assistance. 8 3 An appeal to the Second Circuit ensued.
B. The Second Circuit's Review
The issue addressed by the Second Circuit is the same question that has
plagued federal courts since the enactment of § 1782 in 1964: "whether and
under what circumstances Congress has authorized a district court to order
the production of evidence pursuant to a foreign government's letter[s] roga-
tory in advance of the commencement of an adjudicative proceeding."
' 184
Circuit Judge Newman divided this issue into two, now familiar, subissues.
First, he examined the nature of the proceeding to determine whether there
was an adjudicatory judicial proceeding currently pending in Brazil."8 5 Sec-
ond, after finding that no adjudicatory judicial proceeding was pending, he
analyzed the likelihood and timing of such a proceeding occurring in the
future. '
8 6
1. The Nature of the Proceeding
The panel closely followed the Second Circuit's previous decisions in In-
dia and Fonseca, requiring that the underlying foreign proceeding serve an
impartial adjudicatory function.' 8 7 According to the record, the Brazilian
judge who issued the letters rogatory was not conducting the investiga-
tion. "' The judge merely requested assistance on behalf of Brazilian police,
tax, and currency officials who were in charge of the investigation. 8 9 The
Second Circuit concluded that these officials could not be considered "tribu-
nals" within the meaning of § 1782. "° The resolution of this issue, however,
182. Brazil 11, 700 F. Supp. 723, 725 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), rev'd, 936 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1991).
See also supra note 44.
183. See Brazil II, 700 F. Supp. at 725. Judge Pimentel, the Brazilian judge, and the Bra-
zilian prosecutor also submitted official letters to Judge Haight for the record. Id. Judge
Pimentel stated in her letter that the Brazilian prosecutor was investigating "probable illicit
acts related to tax evasion in connection with probable defalcations in accounts maintained by
Brazilian citizens at the Morgan Guarantee [sic] Trust Company of New York." Id. Judge
Pimentel also confirmed in her letter that "the information requested is to be used exclusively
as evidence in a judicial proceeding [and that it will] not be used for any other purpose." Id.
184. Brazil III, 936 F.2d at 703.
185. Id. at 705.
186. Id. at 705-07.
187. See id.
188. See Brazil 11, 700 F. Supp. 723, 724 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Brazil III, 936 F.2d at 705.
189. Brazil III, 936 F.2d at 705.
190. Id. These officials, by their very nature, cannot be considered impartial adjudicators
because, like the income tax official in India, they solely represent the Brazilian government's
interest in investigating individuals suspected of violating their laws. See supra notes 100-113
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was not dispositive in determining whether assistance should be granted
under § 1782.191 The court acknowledged that there is no requirement that
a judicial proceeding be "pending" before a foreign or international tribu-
nal, 192 and turned to the "likelihood" of an adjudicatory judicial proceeding
taking place in the future. Consequently, the critical issue was timing.
2 Timing of the Proceeding
The circuit court agreed with Judge Haight that there was no adjudicatory
proceeding currently in progress in Brazil. 9 The court rejected, however,
the standards adopted in Crown Prosecution 194 and Trinidad & Tobago,'9"
and formulated a more rigid standard of its own.' 96 The panel held that, in
the absence of a pending judicial proceeding, evidence could be produced
only in the event that the judicial proceeding is "imminent, i.e., very likely to
occur within a brief interval from the request."'
197
The Government'" argued that judicial assistance should be provided
"whenever it appears that an adjudicative proceeding will 'eventual[ly]' oc-
cur."' 99 In support of its argument, the Government relied heavily on a law
review article authored by Professor Hans Smit, the chief draftsman of the
1964 amendments, and argued that the article provides the only direct evi-
dence of why the word "pending" was dropped from § 1782 ."o The Gov-
ernment argued that the court should therefore adopt the view of Professor
and accompanying text (describing the rationale for declining to extend assistance to prosecut-
ing or tax authorities whose primary responsibility was to protect the government's interest in
the case). The court did not address the issue of whether the Brazilian officials qualified as
"interested persons" under § 1782. See Brazil III, 936 F.2d at 705.
191. Id.
192. See id. at 705-07.
193. Id. at 705.
194. 870 F.2d 686, 694 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (requiring judicial proceedings to be "within rea-
sonable contemplation").
195. 848 F.2d 1151, 1156 (11th Cir. 1988) (requiring foreign criminal proceedings to be
"very likely to occur"). Although the panel approved of the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation
of § 1782, it implemented a stricter standard. See Brazil III, 936 F.2d at 706. The court also
rejected Judge Haight's standard that the proceeding be "probable" as being "too lenient." Id.
196. Brazil 111, 936 F.2d at 706 (requiring adjudicative proceedings to be "imminent").
197. Id. at 703. The Second Circuit's "imminence" standard was implemented with the
view of avoiding abuses, such as the "fishing expeditions" that concerned the courts in India
and Fonseca. See id. at 705-07.
198. Generally, the foreign authority issuing the request is represented by an Assistant
United States Attorney in federal court. MANUAL, supra note 2, § 9-13.540. In this case, the
Brazilian authorities were represented by the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern
District of New York. Brazil III, 936 F.2d at 703. Therefore, the "Government" refers to the
United States government.
199. Brazil 111, 936 F.2d at 706.
200. Id.
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Smit and conclude that it is not necessary for a proceeding to be pending at
the time a letters rogatory is issued.201 The Government suggested that the
only limitation imposed by § 1782 is that the evidence sought must eventu-
ally be used in such a proceeding.
2 2
The Second Circuit, however, declined to accept Professor Smit's conclu-
sions regarding Congress' intent when it passed the statute.20 3 Instead, the
panel focused on the lack of authoritative statements by House and Senate
committee members as to what was intended by the deletion of the word
"pending." 2" The court then entertained the possibility that the deletion of
the word "pending" might have been inadvertent.205 In the final analysis,
the court concluded that the Brazilian investigators did not meet the "immi-
nence" standard because "there is nothing in the record to show that adjudi-
cative proceedings are very likely and very soon to be brought against any
particular perpetrators of such illicit acts,, 2 6 and thus denied the requested
judicial assistance.20 7
201. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
202. Brazil III, 936 F.2d at 706 (citing Smit, supra note 22, at 1026).
203. Id. ("Though Professor Smit was undoubtedly in a good position to know what the
congressional committees had in mind, we do not believe it appropriate in this case to accept
his commentary as persuasive evidence of the meaning of the statute that the Congress ulti-
mately enacted."). Specifically, the court reasoned that if Congress had intended to allow the
execution of letters rogatory requesting evidence for use in a proceeding that would eventually
occur, it would have said so. See id.
204. Id. ("If the omission of 'pending' was intended to mean 'eventually occurring,' we
would expect to see at least some hint of that thought in the authoritative reports issued by the
members of the Senate and House committees."). However, in this case, no reports were is-
sued by the Senate and House committees. The only reports in existence are the House and
Senate Reports drafted and submitted by the Commission itself. Congress' actions were lim-
ited to creating the Commission and charging it with improving United States procedures
regarding requests for judicial assistance. Congress passed the Commission's proposed bill
without amendment. This indicates that Congress made a conscious decision to leave the task
of drafting the statute to the experts it specifically recruited for that purpose. See supra note
71.
205. Brazil III, 936 F.2d at 705. But see Trinidad & Tobago, 848 F.2d 1151, 1154-55 (11 th
Cir. 1988) (refusing to "treat Congress' deletion of the word 'pending' as a mistake or mere
accident"), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1005 (1989). The Eleventh Circuit noted that when "the
legislature deletes certain language as it amends a statute, it generally indicates an intent to
change the meaning of the statute." Id. at 1154-55 (citing United States v. Canadian Vinyl
Indus., 555 F.2d 806, 810 (3d Cir. 1977); IA NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 22.01 (4th ed. 1984)).
206. Brazil III, 936 F.2d 702, 707 (2d Cir. 1991). The court relied on the letter submitted
by the Brazilian prosecutor, which identified four individuals under investigation for "possible
violations" and refers only to "possible prosecution." Id. The letter failed to give any indica-
tion of how likely formal proceedings against these individuals were. Id.
207. Id.
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V. BRAZIL III'S ILLOGICAL OUTCOME AND ITS FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
The Second Circuit's interpretation of § 1782 in Brazil III is counterintui-
tive. The court's decision turns on the disposition of one key issue: the rea-
soning behind the deletion of the word "pending" from § 1782.208 Judge
Newman's opinion focuses on the lack of legislative history regarding this
change,209 and uses this to justify the court's application of a draconian "im-
minence" standard which will, in effect, strip § 1782 of its utility.
A. The Court's Failure to Properly Interpret § 1782
In the absence of an explicit statement by Congress in the House and Sen-
ate Reports accompanying the 1964 amendments, the Second Circuit refused
to look any further for evidence of congressional intent. The panel even
entertained the highly remote possibility that the deletion of the word
"pending" was inadvertent.2 1 ° In reality, however, there are several sources
other than the statute's legislative history explaining Congress' rationale for
expanding § 1782.211
The evolution of § 1782, from its enactment in 1855 through its most re-
cent amendment in 1964, provides a very good indication of Congress' intent
regarding the application of the statute.2 12 Congressional support for inter-
national judicial assistance is reflected in the continual expansion and liberal-
ization of the statute and the motivational factors underlying each
amendment.2 1 3 The fact that Congress consistently deleted qualifying
phrases such as "civil action" and "pending" in response to the surge in
international litigation following World War II and simultaneously cor-
rected the procedural inadequacies of § 1782,214 necessarily implies an intent
to expand the instances in which the statute's provisions are available. 2 15
The Second Circuit acknowledged the expansion of § 1782 over the years in
208. Id. at 705. See also supra notes 193-207 and accompanying text.
209. Brazil III, 936 F.2d at 705-07.
210. Id. at 706 (considering the "distinct possibility that the deletion [of 'pending' may] ...
have been inadvertent"). But see supra note 205.
211. See supra notes 20, 22-23.
212. "When interpreting statutes, courts must consider relevant prior statutes," D.N.
MACCORMICK & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, "INTERPRETING STATUTES" A COMPARATIVE
STUDY 423 (1991) (emphasis added), as well as the "[h]istorical conditions the statute was
intended to remedy as evidence of ultimate legislative intent or purpose." Id. at 426.
213. See supra notes 50-90 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 68, 88.
215. Supra note 205 and accompanying text. "[A]ny change of the scope or effect of an
existing statute, by ... omission ... of provisions ... indicates a legislative intention that the
meaning of the statute has been changed and raises the presumption that the legislature in-
tended to change the law." IA SINGER, supra note 205, § 22.01
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a brief footnote.2 16 However, unlike other courts interpreting this statute, it
failed to recognize the history of § 1782 as evidence of congressional intent to
facilitate international judicial assistance.21
The Commission on International Rules of Judicial Procedure was given a
clear congressional mandate when it was created in 1958.218 Its task was to
improve the procedures "necessary or incidental to" international judicial
assistance through the drafting and recommendation of proposed letters ro-
gatory legislation.21 9 The Commission proposed an amendment to § 1782
which, among other things, deleted the word "pending." This omission indi-
cates that a pending proceeding was no longer a prerequisite, but left open
the question of exactly how likely a proceeding must be in order to grant the
requested assistance.22 Neither the statute nor the notes accompanying it
address this issue.221 However, Hans Smit, the chief draftsman of the stat-
ute, does.
Professor Smit's law review article is the only direct evidence of the mean-
ing behind the deletion of the "pending" requirement.222 According to Pro-
fessor Smit, "[i]t is not necessary ... for the proceeding to be pending at the
time the evidence is sought, but only that the evidence is eventually to be
used in such a proceeding. ' 223 While the Second Circuit acknowledged that
Smit was "in a good position to know what the congressional committee had
in mind,, 224 it declined to accept his statement as persuasive evidence of
216. Brazil 17, 936 F.2d 702, 704-05 n.1 (2d Cir. 1991).
217. While the court did acknowledge that the 1964 amendments authorized assistance for
a "broader range of proceedings," id. at 705, it appeared to rely solely on the House and Senate
Reports which accompanied the proposed amendments and prior case law. But see Trinidad &
Tobago, 848 F.2d 1151, 1154 (11 Cir. 1988) (concluding that "the history of section 1782
reflects a congressional desire to increase the power of district courts to respond to requests for
international assistance" following close consideration of the statutory amendments made over
the years) (citing Tokyo, 539 F.2d 1216, 1218 (9th Cir. 1976) (emphasis added)). See also
supra notes 108, 137, 156 and accompanying text.
218. Pub. L. No. 85-906, § 2, 72 Stat. 1743 (1958) (instructing the Commission to study
procedures regarding letters rogatory and recommend appropriate changes to facilitate inter-
national judicial assistance).
219. Id. See also House Report, supra note 23, at 13 (citing congressional mandate).
220. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782. See also supra notes 88, 205 and accompanying text.
221. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1988). See also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 23, at 43-47; SEN-
ATE REPORT, supra note 23, at 7-9.
222. Smit, supra note 22, at 1026; Telephone Interview with Hans Smit, Professor, Colum-
bia University Law School (Sept. 26, 1991) (reaffirming that, by its deletion of "pending" from
§ 1782, Congress intended to require only that the evidence requested is eventually used in a
judicial proceeding).
223. Smit, supra note 22, at 1026.
224. Brazil III, 936 F.2d 702, 706 (2d Cir. 1991).
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such intent.225 Ironically, Professor Smit was a key member of the Commis-
sion's Drafting Committee, 226 which was responsible not only for this
amendment to § 1782, but also for the drafting of the Commission Report
and the Historical and Explanatory Notes accompanying the proposed
bill.227 Ultimately, the bill was passed without amendment, 228 and Professor
Smit's explanation of the change can therefore be said to indicate Congress'
unequivocal approval of the amendment as drafted by Professor Smit and
others.
2 29
Congress has also ratified thirteen mutual legal assistance treaties, each of
which reaffirms Congress' intent to provide assistance in foreign investiga-
tions since the 1964 amendment to § 1782.230 These treaties specifically pro-
vide for assistance in foreign prosecutions and investigations.23 In addition,
the treaties provide that the request be executed according to the laws of the
requested state.232 In the United States, the applicable law governing the
execution of foreign requests for the production of evidence is § 1782.233
Thus, by ratifying these treaties mandating the execution of evidentiary re-
quests for purposes of investigation, Congress must have understood § 1782
to authorize these types of requests.
Based on the perceived "lack" of legislative history, the Second Circuit
rejected the "eventual use" standard proposed in Brazil III,234 as well as the
225. Id. The Second Circuit could have relied on Professor Smit's article and reached the
same conclusion if it were clear that the Brazilian officials did not contemplate a proceeding.
Professor Smit, like the D.C. Circuit in Crown Prosecution, does not advocate assistance unless
the tribunal or party seeking the information reasonably contemplates a proceeding. In this
case, however, based on the letter forwarded by the Brazilian judge, supra note 183, it is clear
that formal proceedings were not only contemplated, but probable.
226. See supra note 76. Professor Smit was also Director of the Columbia Project, the
source of funding for the Commission's work. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
227. See Smit, supra note 22, at 1017. In addition, Professor Smit is cited as an authority
throughout this report to Congress. See generally HOUSE REPORT, supra note 23; SENATE
REPORT, supra note 23.
228. Smit, supra note 22, at 1017.
229. The Second Circuit cites approvingly to the Eleventh Circuit's standard in Trinidad &
Tobago, while simultaneously refusing to consider the opinion of Professor Smit. Id. at 706.
The irony of this stems from the fact that the Eleventh Circuit supports its conclusion by citing
to Professor Smit's law review article. See Trinidad & Tobago, 848 F.2d 1151, 1155 (1 lth Cir.
1988); see also Crown Prosecution, 870 F.2d 686, 690 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
230. See supra note 4.
231. See, e.g., Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of Canada on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, supra note 4, art.
II(1).
232. See, e.g., id. art. VII (2).
233. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1988).
234. Brazil III, 936 F.2d 702, 706 (2d Cir. 1991). The Government proposed a standard
consistent with the D.C. Circuit's standard in Crown Prosecution, which would allow for judi-
cial assistance whenever it appeared that criminal adjudicatory proceedings would "even-
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"probable" standard applied by the district court,235 as "too lenient. ' '2 36
Without sufficient consideration for the future implications of its decision,2 37
the Second Circuit imposed an arbitrary and unworkable standard requiring
an "adjudicative proceeding [to] be imminent" before a court may grant
assistance.238
The Brazil III court, while appropriately concerned about potential "fish-
ing expeditions" and the "risks inherent in making confidential material
available to investigative agencies of countries throughout the world," failed
to appreciate protective safeguards already in place. 239 For example, letters
rogatory in criminal cases are usually not submitted directly to United States
courts for execution. In most cases, the issued requests are sent through the
appropriate diplomatic channels, encountering numerous checkpoints along
the way.24" Accordingly, the Brazilian request was reviewed several times
before being submitted to the New York district court for execution.241 In
fact, the original request was returned to Brazilian authorities for revi-
sions.242 Therefore, by the time the request reached the court, the judge
could have considered the totality of the circumstances and fairly concluded
that, the Brazilian authorities were not on a "fishing expedition."
2 43
B. Future Implications
Three likely negative effects on international judicial assistance stem from
Brazil III. First, because the "imminence" standard adopted by the Second
Circuit is ambiguous and its adoption aggravates the existing conflict among
the circuits as to the appropriate standard to apply, the decision will create
tual[ly] occur." Id. This standard was consistent with Professor Smit's explanation of the
intent of the statute. See Smit, supra note 22, at 1017.
235. Brazil III, 936 F.2d at 706.
236. Id.; But see supra note 82.
237. See infra notes 244-254 and accompanying text.
238. Brazil III, 936 F.2d at 706. This standard is unworkable because the court fails to
define how imminent a proceeding must be in order to qualify under this standard. See infra
text accompanying notes 246-247.
239. Brazil III, 936 F.2d at 706. See supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text.
240. See supra note 17.
241. See Brazil I, 687 F. Supp. 880, 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
242. See id.
243. All courts should be aware of potential foreign "fishing expeditions," and exercise
their discretion to deny a request if there is no basis for the investigation. See supra notes 109-
110, 169, 170 and accompanying text. However, when foreign investigative authorities clearly
demonstrate that a viable investigation of certain individuals exists and that the evidence re-
quested will " 'be used exclusively ... in a (probable]. judicial proceeding'," Brazil II, 700 F.
Supp. 723, 725 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (emphasis added) (quoting the Brazilian judge's declaration to
the court), it should be apparent that no "fishing expedition" exists.
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an increase in litigation. 2" Second, as a result of the inevitable uncertainty
that will surround the "imminence" standard, foreign prosecutors may be
encouraged to prematurely bring charges against innocent individuals who
would have otherwise been cleared by the evidence requested from the
United States. Third, the decision will cause foreign courts to be more sus-
pect of requests for judicial assistance by the United States. Ultimately, if
left in place, Brazil I will restore the obstacles that § 1782 was designed to
remove and, as a result, will greatly impede international law enforcement
efforts.
2 45
The Second Circuit's "imminence" standard is subjective and ambiguous.
While the term "imminence" suggests that a proceeding is going to take
place within a very short period of time, the panel provides no guidance in
determining what exactly it means by "very likely to occur and very soon to
occur." 24 6 For example, there is no indication of whether the proceeding
must take place within a week, a month, or the next two hours. Given this
uncertainty and the varying standards now adopted in three circuits, litiga-
tion surrounding § 1782 will increase until a workable standard, consistent
with the statute's purpose and congressional intent, is adopted by the federal
courts.
2 4 7
The "imminence" standard may also encourage the premature filing of
charges against individuals who would otherwise be cleared by a thorough
and complete investigation. The "[u]se of letters rogatory [to obtain evi-
dence abroad] is a time-consuming process, '248 one which does not necessar-
ily guarantee results. 249 Brazil III implies that pending criminal charges are
essentially a prerequisite to a foreign tribunal obtaining the requested evi-
dence. Therefore, if the requesting party wants to avoid the risk of having its
request denied, the party may file formal charges before submitting the let-
ters rogatory, even if the evidence necessary to bring charges is the very
244. See supra notes 194-196.
245. In 1990 alone, the United States Marshals Service opened 508 international investiga-
tions. 1990 Arr'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 50.
246. See Brazil III, 936 F.2d 702, 706 (2d Cir. 1991).
247. The Supreme Court has not yet addressed this issue. See Trinidad & Tobago, 488 U.S.
1005 (1989) (denying petition for certiorari).
248. Clark, supra note 22, at 54 (describing the lengthy process facing a letters rogatory
before execution).
249. In the end, the execution of a request is at the discretion of the court in the receiving
country. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
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evidence requested.25° This circular effect will undermine the privacy inter-
ests the Second Circuit presumably was trying to protect.25
Brazil III will serve as a signal to other countries that the United States is
not willing to provide international judicial assistance to foreign entities le-
gitimately requesting it.252 The Brazil III decision will cause inconsistent
results when dealing with similar requests made by treaty partners and re-
quests made pursuant to the letters rogatory statute. Treaty partners will
gain access to requested information that non-treaty partners, subject to the
discretion of the courts, will obtain only if formal charges are pending.253 In
reaction to this, foreign courts may adopt the "imminence" standard for
requests by the United States or, in the alternative, even refuse to grant
assistance altogether. Either reaction would pose a major obstacle for our
law enforcement community to overcome and could possibly foster the
growth of international crime.254
VI. CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit's decision in Brazil III is inconsistent with Congress'
intent to improve the procedures for providing international judicial assist-
ance in obtaining evidence located in the United States. Unfortunately, this
decision is part of a disturbing series of Second Circuit § 1782 decisions over
the years. Each decision places an added limitation on what was intended to
be a broad and liberal statute. Given the express purpose of § 1782, to im-
prove the ability of United States courts to provide international judicial
assistance, the interpretations of § 1782 by the Second Circuit are overly
restrictive. The standards imposed by the Second Circuit are also unwork-
able, reflecting the court's continued hostility toward granting judicial assist-
250. Telephone Interview with Hans Smit, Professor, Columbia University Law School
(Sept. 26, 1991) (pointing out the dilemma now facing foreign prosecutors who are requesting
information in the United States in order to determine whether to bring formal charges against
the individual under investigation).
251. Brazil III, 936 F.2d 702, 706-07 (2d Cir. 1991).
252. In the past, lack of cooperation on the part of the United States regarding interna-
tional judicial assistance resulted in similar treatment of United States' requests abroad. See
Jones, supra note 10, at 556-59 (describing the isolationist policies of the United States from
1854 until the end of World War II, and the subsequent effects of these policies). See also
MANUAL, supra note 2, § 9-13.540.
253. See supra notes 230-233 and accompanying text; see also supra note 4.
254. See 1990 ATr'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 47-52 (reporting on the efforts of the United States
Department of Justice to coordinate their efforts with nations worldwide in order to combat
international crime). To combat the illicit drug trade, federal government agencies often com-
bine their efforts with foreign counterparts in the investigation and prosecution of those foster-
ing its development. Id. Without the ability to conduct these "international investigations,"
the law enforcement community of the United States, as well as its foreign counterparts, will
suffer tremendously.
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ance to foreign tribunals. The most recent standard announced by the
Second Circuit in Brazil III will undoubtedly add to what is already a con-
fusing and discouraging process. Ultimately, the Second Circuit's "immi-
nence" standard will effectively limit the ability to obtain judicial assistance
to a select few: those who can prove that judicial proceedings are currently
underway.
Amy Jeanne Conway
